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NATURAL RESOURCE PRICING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Vaman Rao
University of Missouri - Rolla 
Rolla, Missouri
Abstract
In a competitive equilibrium the price of a natural resource will be 
increasing at a rate equal to the social time preference rate, but in a 
monopoly market, the price will be increasing at less than social time 
preference rate. If the producer countries utilise their monopoly of 
production and sale of a natural resource for the purpose of developing 
their economies, the price of the natural resource will be growing at the 
rate at which the producer countries' economies are growing, whether or 
not the sales proceeds are used to finance their investment programmes, 
fully or partly.
I, Introduction
The problem of analyzing the price-behavior 
of a non-renewable natural resource has, 
of late, attracted considerable attention. 
The quadrupling of petroleum prices has 
prompted the persistent question whether 
the countries having large and nearly 
exclusive reserves of a natural resource, 
can fix the price and limit the supply of 
their product at will. Since the petroleum 
exercise has apparently achieved consid­
erable success from the producers' point 
of view, there seem to be some efforts in 
motion to create institutional structures 
aimed at achieving similar successes in 
other areas. The problem, however, is not 
a new one. It was analyzed from a conser­
vationist point of view by Hotelling (1931). 
Scott (1965) discussed the problem of out­
put regulation of a natural resource when 
shifts over time occurred in costs and 
prices, due to changes in technological 
and demand conditions . Gordon (1967) 
emphasized the influence of market condi­
tions in the future on current output 
decisions. Little study, however, has 
been made of how the prices and quantities 
to be supplied are determined in a market 
which is nowhere near being perfectly 
competitive and in which the producers 
have the avowed aim of developing their 
national economies at a faster rate of 
growth.
Section II presents a simple model of a 
non-renewable natural resource being 
traded in a competitive market and dis­
cusses the conditions that affect the 
price-behavior. Section III presents a 
monopoly market situation and analyses 
how the changed market situation affects 
the prices. Section IV raises the problem 
of unequal geographical distribution of 
natural resources and discusses the issues 
implied in this discrepancy between pro­
duction and consumption among nations. It 
analyses further what happens to the price 
behavior when the investment funds for the 
accelerated development of producer country 
come, fully or partly, from the sale pro­
ceeds of the natural resource . Section V 
summarizes the results.
II. The Simple Model
We start with a simple model of a resource 
which is non-renewable. The producer has 
complete knowledge of the total stock of 
the resource that could be extracted at ' 
zero costs almost fully and once it is 
extracted, it cannot ever be replaced.
Let the total quantity of known and ex­
tractable resource be q and let be the 
quantity produced in period t such that
00
tlQ qt < q (1)
Assume perfectly competitive market condi­
tions, with a risk-free interest rate r, 
which could be used as a proxy for the
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social time preference rate. Let the 
period-wise demand function for that 
particular natural resource be given by
P t - d t (,t > (2)
In these conditions the optimum course for 
the producers would be to maximise the 
present value of the discounted sum of the 
total revenue (= total profits) which is 
given by the quantity
p.V. = £ (l+rjt dt(qt) qt (3)
Subject to the supply constraint (1). 
Associated with the optimum solution 
would be an output stream given by the 
sequence {gt}. Setting a Lagrangean and 
differentiating it with respect to gt, 
we get the solution
dt(qt) = A (l+r)t (t = 0,1,2,...) (4)
The value of \, the shadow price of the 
natural resource, can be obtained by 
substituting t=0, in (4), which would be 
equal to dQ(q0) = pQ, so that (4) can be 
written as
dt(qt) = d0(qQ) (l+r)t (t = 0,1,2,.) (5)
This shows that in a perfectly competitive 
market the price of the natural resource 
will be increasing at the rate r.
Given the demand function, the constraint 
condition (1) and the assumption t=T, the 
period in which the resource is completely 
exhausted, the initial and the maximum 
prices, dQ(qQ) and dT(qT), can be easily 
obtained.
Let the demand be represented by the 
linear function
gt = a - Bpt (6)
At t=T, since q will be completely ex­
hausted, qT = 0. So pT = a/3, will be 
the maximum price that could be obtained 
in a competitive market.
The two values represent the p intercept 
of the long-run demand function and the 
point of intersection of the demand 
function and the long-run perfectly 
inelastic supply function. If the demand 
function doesn't ever intersect the price 
axis, then the total stock of the natural 
resource will never be fully exhausted 
and the price will remain undetermined.
The initial price could be zero when 
the total known reserves are large enough 
for the demand function to intersect the 
quantity axis and thus become a free good.
III. The Monopoly Behavior
The optimum course for a monopolist is to 
maximise the discounted sum of the total 
revenue stream (3) subject to the con­
straint (1) . Associated with this maximum 
value for the monopolist would be an out­
put stream represented by the sequence of 
quantities {q}. The Lagrangean that is 
set up, when differentiated with respect 
to q£, now gives a different solution, 
which is
dt (qt ) + dt (qt ) q t  = X ( l + r ) t  ( t = 0 , 1 , 2 ,  . . )  (7)
Noting that the LHS of (7) is the marginal 
revenue in period t and by obtaining the 
value of \ by substituting t = 0, (7) can
be written as
mt « mQ (l+r)t (8)
Where is the marginal revenue in period 
t. This solution indicates the price 
behavior modification in a monopoly market 
relative to a competitive market. It is 
not the price, but the marginal revenue 
that increases at the rate r. Since for 
any given positive quantity marginal 
revenue is smaller than price, the price 
will increase at a rate less than r.
For the demand function (6)
the marginal revenue is given by
Using (1) and (5), (6) can be summed up
and written as
lqt = g = Ea - &ZpQ (l+r)T
which gives the solution 
not - qd (q ) o 1 0rJ
a - 2g t
and the price 
P, = < 5 + mt) / 2
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The maximum price that the monopolist 
could charge would be equal to the price- 
intercept of the demand function (i.e. 
a/$ and the minimum initial price would 
be the same as in the competitive condi­
tions, unless the known reserves are large 
enough as not to effect the supply con­
straint (1). When the marginal revenue 
is zero, the monopolist will still be 
charging  ^. 2 as the price.
2 p
IV. Less Developed Countries and 
the natural resources
The geographical distribution of natural 
resources, viewed at the present time, 
has given rise to a peculiar problem.
At least in respect of some important 
natural resources, the consuming countries 
are endowed with little or no known 
reserves, while the producing countries, 
which have the most reserves, (and which 
are 'poor' otherwise), find that their 
reserves of natural resources are a sure 
source of investment funds, so badly 
needed to transform their economies. 
Realizing that the present prices are too 
low, they feel that they should price 
their product in such a way that they get 
the maximum amounts of investment funds, 
without having to exhaust the stock of 
the reserve too rapidly. This feeling 
stems from the thought that once they 
exhaust their known reserves they would 
be left with no source to fall back upon, 
and that their economies will continue to 
remain backward.
under the constraint (1) .
Associated with this maximisa 
would be a sequence of quanti 
which they will be selling in 






pt = A d+g)t (t = 0 ,1 ,2 ,--- )
Where X could be interpreted as the shadow 
cost of development per unit of natural 
resource. The price, therefore, will be 
growing at the rate g. But by (4), we 
know that in competitive conditions d^fg^) 
grows at the rate r. If g = r, then both 
the quantities will be the same. In the 
event g > r, pfc > dt (qt) and if p < dt(9t) 
when g<r, an unlikely event. Similarly 
modified relationship we would observe in 
the behavior of marginal revenue in a 
monopoly market situation, where the price 
of the natural resource will be increasing 
at a rate less than g. Cartelization 
of oil trade could indeed be better for 
consuming countries.
Let us relax the assumption that all the
investment funds are a
the sale of the natura
they form on1 y a Part
requirements / the othe
from the domestic savi
quantit y to be maximis
pressed as
1 <Pt qt - svPtqt}
cquired through 
1 resource. If 
of the total 
r part coming 
ngs, then the 
ed could be ex-
(l+g)~t (U)
Let us assume a simple economy, growing 
at a steady-state rate, g. Let the 
investment funds required to sustain 
this rate of growth in period t be pt gt ,
the total revenue obtained by the sale of
the natural resource , under the assump tion
that the sa1 e of the natural resource out-
put is the only source of investment.
The quantity pt qt will be growing at
ra te g, as in a steady state
Pt qt = p q o o (1+ 9)
t (9)
It is obvious that the funds equalling 






Where s i s the savings propensity and V
is the constant output capital ratio .
Adjoining (11) and (1) and differen tiating
the Lag rangean with respect to qtr we get .
Pt (1-sv) -= X (1+g) t (t=o,1,2 , ...) (1
or
X tPt = — --- (1 + g)t1-sv
Since sv is likely to be much less than 
unity, the initial price will be set at 
a higher level. The annual increase will 
however, take place at the same rate g.
process of growth in period t, as will 
tqt (l+g)~'t: in the initial period, 
efore, the producer countries will 
t an optimum course when they maximise 
quantity
l Ptqt (1+9) t-0
-1 (1 0 )
V. Summary and Conclusions
In a competitive equilibrium the price 
of a natural resource will be increasing 
at a rate equal to the social time 
preference rate, r. In a monopoly 
situation the rise in prices will be
284
a t  a r a t e  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  s o c i a l  t i m e  
p r e f e r e n c e  r a t e ,  as i t  i s  t h e  m a r g i n a l  
r e v e n u e  w h i c h  w i l l  b e  i n c r e a s i n g  at t h e  
s o c i a l  t i m e  p r e f e r e n c e  r a t e .  I f  the 
p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  t h e  a i m  o f  
u s i n g  th e s a l e s  p r o c e e d s  o f  t h e i r  n a t u r a l  
r e s o u r c e  r e s e r v e s  to d e v e l o p  t h e i r  
e c o n o m i e s  a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  g r o w t h , g, t h e n  
t h e  p r i c e  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e  w i l l
a l s o b e g r o w i n g a t th e ra te g . g co u 1 d
b e g r e a te r th a n r o r e q u a 1 to r , or 1 e ss
tha n r , in w h i c h  ca s e the p r i  c e w i l l b e
r i s i n g a t t h e h i g h e r r a t e I f p a r t o f
th e f u n ds f o r i n v e s tm en t a r e  h o w e v e r /
p r o v i d e d b y  th e d o m e s tic s a v i n gs the n
t h e p r i ce- r i s e w i l l t a k e p l a c e a t th e r a t e ,
9 > b u t th e i n i t i a l p r i ce w i l l b e s e t a t a
h i g h e r  l e v e l .
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